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The Capacity of Symmetric
Private Information Retrieval
Hua Sun, Syed A. Jafar
Abstract
Private information retrieval (PIR) is the problem of retrieving as efficiently as possible,
one out of K messages from N non-communicating replicated databases (each holds all K
messages) while keeping the identity of the desired message index a secret from each individual
database. Symmetric PIR (SPIR) is a generalization of PIR to include the requirement that
beyond the desired message, the user learns nothing about the other K − 1 messages. The
information theoretic capacity of SPIR (equivalently, the reciprocal of minimum download cost)
is the maximum number of bits of desired information that can be privately retrieved per bit
of downloaded information. We show that the capacity of SPIR is 1 − 1/N regardless of the
number of messages K, if the databases have access to common randomness (not available to
the user) that is independent of the messages, in the amount that is at least 1/(N − 1) bits
per desired message bit, and zero otherwise. Extensions to the capacity region of SPIR and the
capacity of finite length SPIR are provided.
This paper was presented in part at NETCOD 2016. Hua Sun (email: huas2@uci.edu) and Syed A. Jafar (email:
syed@uci.edu) are with the Center of Pervasive Communications and Computing (CPCC) in the Department of
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS) at the University of California Irvine.
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1 Introduction
The private information retrieval (PIR) problem [1, 2] seeks the most efficient way for a user to
retrieve a desired message from a set of distributed databases, each of which stores all the mes-
sages, without revealing any information about which message is being retrieved to any individual
database. This seemingly impossible mission has a trivial (expensive) solution, i.e., the user can re-
quest all the messages to hide his interest. The goal of the PIR problem is to find the most efficient
solution. The capacity of PIR is defined as the maximum number of bits of desired message that
can be privately downloaded per bit of downloaded information. In our recent work [3], the capacity
of PIR with K messages and N databases was shown to be CPIR = (1 + 1/N + · · ·+ 1/NK−1)−1.
The original formulation of PIR only considers the privacy of the user. The privacy of the
undesired messages is ignored. However, it is often desirable to restrict the user to retrieve nothing
beyond his chosen message. This new constraint is called database privacy, and with this constraint,
the problem is called symmetric1 PIR (SPIR) [4]. Symmetric PIR is especially challenging because
the databases must individually learn nothing about the identity of the desired message, but must
still collectively allow the user to retrieve his desired message in such a way that the user learns
nothing about any other message besides his desired message. For example, the trivial solution
of downloading everything, is no longer acceptable. The main contribution of this work is the
characterization of the capacity of SPIR, i.e., the maximum number of bits of desired message
that can be privately retrieved by a user per bit of downloaded information, without leaking any
information about undesired messages to the user. For K messages and N databases, we show that
the capacity is 1− 1/N . Extensions of the main result, from capacity to capacity region and from
infinite message length to arbitrary message length, are also provided.
Besides its direct applications, PIR is especially significant as a fundamental problem that lies
at the intersection of several open problems in cryptography [5, 6], coding theory [7, 8, 9] and
complexity theory [10]. SPIR inherits many of these connections from PIR. For example, SPIR is
essentially a (distributed) form of oblivious transfer [11, 12], where the typical objective is that the
transmitter(s) should not know which message is received by the receiver and the receiver should
obtain nothing more than the desired message. Oblivious transfer is an important building block
(primitive) in cryptography, whose feasibility leads to many other cryptographic protocols [13, 14].
Fundamental limits on the communication efficiency of various forms of oblivious transfer therefore
represent an important class of open problems [15, 16]. The capacity characterization of SPIR is a
promising step in this direction.
Notation: For n1, n2 ∈ Z, n1 ≤ n2, define the notation [n1 : n2] as the set {n1, n1 + 1, · · · , n2}.
For an index set I = {i1, i2, · · · , in}, with i1 < i2 < · · · < in, the notation AI represents the vector
(Ai1 , Ai2 , · · · , Ain). For an element iθ in the set I = {i1, i2, · · · , in}, i.e., iθ ∈ I, the notation iθ
represents the complement of {iθ}, i.e., iθ 4= {i1, · · · , iθ−1, iθ+1, · · · , in}.
2 Problem Statement
Consider K independent messages W1, · · · ,WK ,Wk ∈ FlkL×1p , k ∈ [1 : K], lk ∈ Z+, L ∈ Z+, where
Wk is represented as an lkL × 1 vector comprised of lkL i.i.d. uniform symbols from a finite field
Fp for a prime p. In p-ary units,
H(W1, · · · ,WK) = H(W1) + · · ·+H(WK), (1)
1Symmetry means that the privacy of both the user and the database is considered.
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H(Wk) = lkL,∀k ∈ [1 : K]. (2)
There are N databases. Each database stores all the messages W1, · · · ,WK .
Let us use F to denote a random variable privately generated by the user, whose realization is
not available to the servers. F represents the randomness in the strategies followed by the user.
The user privately generates θ uniformly from [1 : K] and wishes to retrieve Wθ privately. The
databases do not want to give out any information beyond the one message of the user’s choosing
(Wθ). In order to achieve database-privacy, we assume that the databases share a common random
variable S that is not known to the user. It has been shown that without such common randomness,
SPIR is not feasible [4]. For a pictorial illustration of an example of the SPIR problem with K
messages and 2 databases, see Figure 1. F is generated independently and before the realizations
of the messages, the common randomness or the desired message index are known, so that
H(θ,F ,W1, · · · ,WK , S) = H(θ) +H(F) +H(W1) + · · ·+H(WK) +H(S). (3)
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Figure 1: The SPIR problem with K messages and 2 databases.
Suppose θ = k. In order to retrieve message Wk, k ∈ [1 : K] privately, the user privately
generates N queries Q
[k]
1 , · · · , Q[k]N .
H(Q
[k]
1 , · · · , Q[k]N |F) = 0,∀k ∈ [1 : K]. (4)
The user sends query Q
[k]
n to the n-th database, n ∈ [1 : N ]. Upon receiving Q[k]n , the n-th database
generates an answering string A
[k]
n , which is a function of Q
[k]
n , all messages W1, · · · ,WK , and the
common randomness S,
H(A[k]n |Q[k]n ,W1, · · · ,WK , S) = 0. (5)
Each database returns to the user its answer A
[k]
n .
From all the information that is now available to the user (Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N ,F), the user decodes
the desired message Wk according to a decoding rule that is specified by the SPIR scheme. Let Pe
denote the probability of error achieved with the specified decoding rule.
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To protect the user’s privacy, the K strategies must be indistinguishable (identically distributed)
from the perspective of any individual database, i.e., the following user-privacy constraint must be
satisfied2,
[User-Privacy] (Q[k]n , A
[k]
n ,W1:K , S) ∼ (Q[k
′]
n , A
[k′]
n ,W1:K , S),
∀k, k′ ∈ [1 : K],∀n ∈ [1 : N ]. (6)
Symmetric PIR also requires protecting the privacy of the database, i.e., it must be ensured that
the user learns nothing more than the desired messageWk. So the vectorWk = (W1, · · · ,Wk−1,Wk+1, · · · ,WK),
must be independent of all the information available to the user. Thus, the following database-
privacy constraint must be satisfied:
[DB-Privacy] I(Wk ;Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N ,F) = 0, ∀k ∈ [1 : K]. (7)
The SPIR rate of Wk characterizes the amount of desired information retrieved per downloaded
symbol, and is defined as follows.
Rk
4
=
lkL
D
. (8)
where D is the maximum value of the total number of symbols downloaded by the user from all
the databases.
A rate tuple (R1, · · · , RK) is said to be -error achievable if ∀k ∈ [1 : K], there exists a sequence
of PIR schemes, indexed by L, where the rate of Wk is greater than or equal to Rk and Pe → 0 as
L→∞. Note that for such a sequence of SPIR schemes, from Fano’s inequality, we must have
[Correctness] o(L) =
1
L
H(Wk|Q[k]1:N , A[k]1:N ,F) (9)
(4)
=
1
L
H(Wk|A[k]1:N ,F) (10)
where o(L) represents a term whose value approaches zero as L approaches infinity. The closure of
the set of all -error achievable rate tuples is called the capacity region C.
3 Results
3.1 Capacity of SPIR
In the typical setting of SPIR, the sizes of the messages are the same, i.e., lk = 1, ∀k ∈ [1 : K] and
the rate (refer to (8)) of each message is the same. Then the capacity region is characterized by
one single parameter, i.e., the supremum of the achievable rate, named the capacity. We denote
the capacity as C.
When there is only K = 1 message, note that the database-privacy constraint is satisfied
trivially, so that SPIR reduces to the PIR setting and the capacity is 1. For K ≥ 2, it is known
that some common randomness S is necessary for the feasibility of SPIR. Let us define ρ as the
amount of common randomness relative to the message size
ρ =
H(S)
H(W )
=
H(S)
L
(11)
2The User-Privacy constraint is equivalently expressed as I(θ;Q
[θ]
n , A
[θ]
n ,W1:K , S) = 0.
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The capacity should depend on ρ, and because availability of common randomness at the databases
is a non-trivial requirement, this dependence is of some interest.
When there is only N = 1 database, it is easy to see that the database-privacy constraint,
the user-privacy constraint and correctness constraint conflict with each other such that SPIR is
not feasible and the capacity is zero. The reason is as follows. First, because of the user-privacy
constraint (6), the answer from the only database A
[k]
1 is identically distributed for all k ∈ [1 : K].
Second, from the correctness constraint (10), from A
[k]
1 ,F , one can decode Wk. Combining these
two facts, we have that from A
[k]
1 ,F , one can decode all messages W1, · · · ,WK . This contradicts
the database-privacy constraint (7). Therefore, when N = 1 and K ≥ 2, SPIR is not feasible.
The following theorem states the capacity of SPIR, when we have N ≥ 2 databases and K ≥ 2
messages.
Theorem 1 For SPIR with K ≥ 2 messages and N ≥ 2 databases, the capacity is
CSPIR =
{
1− 1/N if ρ ≥ 1N−1
0 otherwise
(12)
The following observations place Theorem 1 in perspective.
1. We notice a surprising threshold phenomenon in the dependence of SPIR capacity, CSPIR, on
the amount of common randomness ρ. When ρ < 1N−1 , SPIR is not feasible and CSPIR = 0.
However, when ρ ≥ 1N−1 , SPIR is not only possible, but the rate can immediately be increased
to the maximum possible, i.e., the capacity. Therefore, the minimum common randomness
required to achieve any positive rate is already sufficient to achieve the capacity of SPIR.
A pictorial illustration of the SPIR capacity and its dependency on the amount of common
randomness appears in Figure 2.
0
CSPIR
⇢
1` 1
N
1
N`1
Figure 2: SPIR capacity.
2. The capacity of SPIR is independent of the number of messages, K.
3. When the capacity is non-zero, the capacity is strictly increasing in the number of databases,
N , and when N approaches infinity, the capacity approaches 1.
4. It is interesting to compare the capacity of SPIR and the capacity of PIR [3],
CPIR =
(
1 + 1/N + 1/N2 + · · ·+ 1/NK−1)−1 . (13)
We see that the capacity of SPIR is strictly smaller than the capacity of PIR (the additional
requirement of preserving database-privacy strictly hurts) and the capacity of PIR approaches
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the capacity of SPIR when the number of messages, K, approaches infinity (in the large
number of messages regime, the penalty vanishes), i.e., CPIR > CSPIR for any finite K and
CPIR → CSPIR when K →∞.
5. The achievable scheme presented in Section 4.1.1 has exactly zero error. Further, In the
achievability proof for Theorem 1, the message size is N − 1 bits per message. Therefore, to
achieve capacity, message size is not required to approach infinity. By employing the scheme
multiple times, we know that when message size is equal to an integer multiple of N − 1 bits,
the capacity is achieved as well. When the message size is not equal to an integer multiple
of N − 1 bits, it turns out that there is a penalty in the form of a ceiling operation. This
extension of SPIR to finite length messages is considered in Theorem 3, to be presented in
Section 3.3.
6. We note that the converse (upper bound, presented in Section 4.1.2) holds for arbitrary
message size L when we require exactly zero error, by replacing the o(L) terms with zero.
7. The extension to unequal message sizes is considered in Section 3.2.
In the following sections, we relax each one of the two assumptions by itself, i.e., equal message
sizes and message length L going to infinity.
3.2 Capacity Region of SPIR
In this section, we relax the assumption of equal message sizes, i.e., lk,∀k ∈ [1 : K] are arbitrary.
Therefore, going beyond the (symmetric) capacity, we wish to characterize the capacity region of
SPIR.
When we only have K = 1 message, similar to the previous section, the capacity region is
characterized by the capacity of one message, which is 1. When we only have N = 1 database and
K ≥ 2 messages, similar to the previous section, SPIR is not feasible and the capacity region is
the zero vector. Therefore, we consider K ≥ 2 messages and N ≥ 2 databases, where the capacity
region of SPIR is characterized in the following theorem. Here the amount of common randomness
is normalized with respective to the largest message size.
ρ =
H(S)
maxi:i∈[1:K]H(Wi)
=
H(S)
maxi:i∈[1:K] liL
, (14)
Theorem 2 For SPIR with K ≥ 2 messages and N ≥ 2 databases, the capacity region C is
C =
{
(R1, · · · , RK) : Rk ≤ lk
maxi li
(1− 1
N
),∀k ∈ [1 : K]
}
, if ρ ≥ 1
N − 1 (15)
and the zero vector otherwise.
Remark: The optimal (minimum) normalized download cost D/L = lk/Rk = maxi li
N
N−1 is the
same for each message.
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3.3 Capacity of Finite Length SPIR
In this section, we again assume that all messages have the same length, but relax the assumption
that L approaches infinity. Instead, we assume that L is an arbitrary finite value. As L is finite, we
consider zero error achievable rates and define its supremum as zero error capacity, denoted as Co.
This setting can be obtained from the general problem statement by setting lk = 1,∀k ∈ [1 : K],
and L finite.
Similar to Section 3.1, we restrict to K ≥ 2 and N ≥ 2 cases as the problem is trivial when
K = 1 or N = 1. The capacity of finite length SPIR is characterized in the following theorem. The
relative size of the common randomness, ρ, is defined as in (11).
Theorem 3 For SPIR with K ≥ 2 messages, N ≥ 2 databases, where each message is of size
L ∈ Z+ symbols, the zero error capacity is
Co,LSPIR =
{
L/d LCSPIR e = L/d L1−1/N e if ρ ≥
dL/(N−1)e
L
0 otherwise
(16)
4 Proofs
4.1 Proof of Theorem 1
4.1.1 Achievability
In this section, we present the scheme that achieves rate 1−1/N , when ρ = 1/(N−1). To this end,
we assume each message consists of N − 1 bits and each answering string is 1 bit. Specifically, we
assume Wk = (xk,1, · · · , xk,N−1), ∀k ∈ [1 : K] where each xk,i, i ∈ [1 : N − 1] is one bit. We further
assume the entropy of the common random variable S is 1 bit, i.e., S is uniformly distributed over
{0, 1}. Note that S is independent of the messages.
Next we specify the queries. To retrieve Wk privately, the user first generates a random vec-
tor of length (N − 1)K, [h1,1, · · · , h1,N−1, · · · , hk,1, · · · , hK,N−1], where each element is uniformly
distributed over {0, 1}. Then the queries are set as follows.
Q
[k]
1 = [h1,1, · · · , hk,1, · · · , hk,N−1, · · · , hK,N−1]
Q
[k]
2 = [h1,1, · · · , hk,1 + 1, · · · , hk,N−1, · · · , hK,N−1]
· · ·
Q
[k]
N = [h1,1, · · · , hk,1, · · · , hk,N−1 + 1, · · · , hK,N−1] (17)
The answering strings are generated by using the query vector as the combining coefficients and
producing the corresponding linear combination of message bits. We further add the common
random variable to each answer.
A
[k]
1 =
K∑
j=1
N−1∑
i=1
hj,ixj,i + S
A
[k]
2 =
K∑
j=1
N−1∑
i=1
hj,ixj,i + xk,1 + S
· · ·
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A
[k]
N =
K∑
j=1
N−1∑
i=1
hj,ixj,i + xk,N−1 + S (18)
The user obtains xk,i, i ∈ [1 : N − 1] by subtracting A[k]1 from A[k]i+1. Therefore, the correctness
condition is satisfied.
Privacy of the user is guaranteed because each query is independent of the desired message index
k. This is because regardless of the desired message index k, each of the query vectors Q
[k]
n ,∀n is
individually comprised of elements that are i.i.d. uniform over {0, 1}. Thus, each database learns
nothing about which message is requested.
We now show that database-privacy is preserved as well.
I(Wk ;A
[k]
1 , A
[k]
2 , · · · , A[k]N , Q[k]1:N ,F) (19)
= I(Wk ;A
[k]
1 , A
[k]
1 + xk,1, · · · , A[k]1 + xk,N−1, Q[k]1:N ,F) (20)
= I(Wk ;A
[k]
1 , xk,1, · · · , xk,N−1, Q[k]1:N ,F) (21)
= I(Wk ;A
[k]
1 ,Wk, Q
[k]
1:N ,F) (22)
(3)(4)
= I(Wk ;A
[k]
1 |Wk, Q[k]1:N ,F) (23)
= 0 (24)
where in each step, the transformation on the variables is invertible such that mutual information
remains the same. The last step follows from the independence of the messages and the common
randomness (refer to (3)).
Note that because each answering string is 1 bit and the message is L = N − 1 bits, the rate
achieved is (N − 1)/N = 1 − 1/N which matches the capacity. Also note that only the minimum
threshold amount of common randomness is utilized, i.e., ρ = 1/(N − 1).
4.1.2 Converse
Although Theorem 1 restricts to the setting where lk = 1, ∀k ∈ [1 : K], we do not assume this at
the beginning in the proof of converse. This will make the converse general such that some of the
intermediate steps can be used in the converse proofs of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 as well.
For the converse we allow any feasible SPIR scheme, and prove that its rate cannot be larger
than CSPIR. Let us start with two lemmas that will be used later in the proof.
Lemma 1
H(A[k]n |Wk, Q[k]n ) = H(A[k
′]
n |Wk, Q[k
′]
n ) (25)
H(A[k]n |Q[k]n ) = H(A[k
′]
n |Q[k
′]
n ), ∀n ∈ [1 : N ] (26)
Proof: Since the proofs of (25) and (26) follow from the same arguments, here we will present
only the proof of (25). From the User-Privacy constraint (6) we know that ∀k ∈ [1 : K],∀n ∈ [1 : N ],
I(θ;A
[θ]
n ,Wk, Q
[θ]
n ) = 0. Therefore, we must have ∀k′ ∈ [1 : K],
H(A[k]n ,Wk, Q
[k]
n ) = H(A
[k′]
n ,Wk, Q
[k′]
n ) (27)
H(Wk, Q
[k]
n ) = H(Wk, Q
[k′]
n ) (28)
Combining (27) and (28), we obtain H(A
[k]
n |Wk, Q[k]n ) = H(A[k
′]
n |Wk, Q[k
′]
n ).
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Lemma 2
H(A[k]n |Wk,F , Q[k]n ) = H(A[k]n |Wk, Q[k]n ), ∀n ∈ [1 : N ] (29)
Proof: Since
H(A[k]n |Wk, Q[k]n )−H(A[k]n |Wk,F , Q[k]n ) = I(A[k]n ;F|Wk, Q[k]n ) ≥ 0, (30)
we only need to prove I(A
[k]
n ;F|Wk, Q[k]n ) ≤ 0.
I(A[k]n ;F|Wk, Q[k]n ) (31)
≤ I(A[k]n ,W1, · · · ,WK , S;F|Wk, Q[k]n ) (32)
= I(W1, · · · ,WK , S;F|Wk, Q[k]n ) + I(A[k]n ;F|W1, · · · ,WK , S,Wk, Q[k]n )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(33)
≤ I(W1, · · · ,WK , S;F , Q[k]n ) (34)
= 0 (35)
where the second term in (33) is zero because of (5) and (35) follows from (3), (4).
The proof for R ≤ CSPIR. For every feasible SPIR scheme, we must satisfy the database-privacy
constraint (7),
0 = I(Wk′ ;A
[k′]
1 , · · · , A[k
′]
N , Q
[k′]
1 , · · · , Q[k
′]
N ,F) (36)
such that ∀n ∈ [1 : N ],∀k ∈ [1 : K], k 6= k′,
0 = I(Wk;A
[k′]
n , Q
[k′]
n ) (37)
= H(A[k
′]
n |Q[k
′]
n )−H(A[k
′]
n |Wk, Q[k
′]
n ) (38)
(25)
= H(A[k
′]
n |Q[k
′]
n )−H(A[k]n |Wk, Q[k]n ) (39)
Now, consider the answering strings A
[k]
1 , · · · , A[k]N , from which we can decode Wk.
lkL = H(Wk)
(3)
= H(Wk|F) (40)
(10)
= I(Wk;A
[k]
1 , · · · , A[k]N |F) + o(L)L (41)
= H(A
[k]
1 , · · · , A[k]N |F)−H(A[k]1 , · · · , A[k]N |Wk,F) + o(L)L (42)
(4)
≤ H(A[k]1 , · · · , A[k]N |F)−H(A[k]n |Wk,F , Q[k]n ) + o(L)L (43)
(29)
= H(A
[k]
1 , · · · , A[k]N |F)−H(A[k]n |Wk, Q[k]n ) + o(L)L (44)
(39)
= H(A
[k]
1 , · · · , A[k]N |F)−H(A[k
′]
n |Q[k
′]
n ) + o(L)L (45)
(26)
= H(A
[k]
1 , · · · , A[k]N |F)−H(A[k]n |Q[k]n ) + o(L)L (46)
(4)
≤ H(A[k]1 , · · · , A[k]N |F)−H(A[k]n |F) + o(L)L (47)
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Adding (47) for all n ∈ [1 : N ], we have
NlkL ≤ NH(A[k]1 , · · · , A[k]N |F)−
∑
n∈[1:N ]
H(A[k]n |F) + o(L)L (48)
≤ (N − 1)H(A[k]1 , · · · , A[k]N |F) + o(L)L (49)
≤ (N − 1)
N∑
n=1
H(A[k]n ) + o(L)L (50)
≤ (N − 1)D + o(L)L (51)
Rk =
lkL
D
≤ 1− 1
N
(Letting L→∞) (52)
Thus, the rate of any feasible SPIR scheme cannot be more than CSPIR.
The proof for ρ ≥ 1/(N − 1). Suppose a feasible SPIR scheme exists that achieves a non-zero
SPIR rate. Then we will show that it must have ρ ≥ 1/(N − 1). Consider the answering strings
A
[k]
1 , · · · , A[k]N , from which we can decode Wk. From the database-privacy constraint, we have
0 = I(Wk ;A
[k]
1 , · · · , A[k]N ,F) (53)
(3)
= I(Wk ;A
[k]
1 , · · · , A[k]N |F) (54)
(10)
= I(Wk ;A
[k]
1 , · · · , A[k]N ,Wk|F) + o(L)L (55)
(3)
= I(Wk ;A
[k]
1 , · · · , A[k]N |Wk,F) + o(L)L (56)
≥ I(Wk ;A[k]n |Wk,F) + o(L)L (57)
= H(A[k]n |Wk,F)−H(A[k]n |W1, · · · ,WK ,F) + o(L)L (58)
(4)(5)
= H(A[k]n |Wk,F)−H(A[k]n |W1, · · · ,WK ,F)
+H(A[k]n |W1, · · · ,WK ,F , S) + o(L)L (59)
= H(A[k]n |Wk,F)− I(S;A[k]n |W1, · · · ,WK ,F) + o(L)L (60)
(4)
≥ H(A[k]n |Wk,F , Q[k]n )−H(S) + o(L)L (61)
(29)
= H(A[k]n |Wk, Q[k]n )−H(S) + o(L)L (62)
(39)
= H(A[k
′]
n |Q[k
′]
n )−H(S) + o(L)L (63)
(26)
= H(A[k]n |Q[k]n )−H(S) + o(L)L (64)
Adding (64) for n ∈ [1 : N ], we have
0 ≥
∑
n∈[1:N ]
H(A[k]n |Q[k]n )−NH(S) + o(L)L (65)
≥ H(A[k]1 , · · · , A[k]N |F)−NH(S) + o(L)L (66)
(49)
≥ N
N − 1 lkL−NH(S) + o(L)L (67)
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⇒ H(S) ≥ 1
N − 1 lkL+ o(L)L (68)
⇒ ρ = H(S)
lkL
≥ 1
N − 1 (Letting L→∞) (69)
Thus, the amount of common randomness relative to the message size of any feasible SPIR scheme
cannot be less than 1/(N − 1).
4.2 Proof for Theorem 2
4.2.1 Achievability
Without loss of generality, we assume that l1 ≤ l2 ≤ · · · ≤ lK . As a result, we need to prove that
for Wk, rate (1 − 1/N)lk/lK is achievable, when ρ = 1/(N − 1). Here is such a scheme. We set
L = N − 1. We divide each message into K sub-messages and for each sub-message, we use the
SPIR scheme (17), (18). That is
Wk = (Wk(1),Wk(2), · · · ,Wk(K)) (70)
Wk(i) ∈ F(li−li−1)L×12 (Define l0 = 0) (71)
Note that H(Wk) = lkL, so we set Wk(i) to zero vectors, when i ∈ [k + 1 : K]. For sub-messages
(W1(i),W2(i), · · · ,WK(i)), we employ the SPIR scheme (17), (18) lk − lk−1 times independently.
Therefore the number of bits downloaded, denoted asDk(i), and the amount of common randomness
used, H(S(i)), are obtained as follows. ∀i ∈ [1 : K],
Dk(i) = (lk − lk−1)L/(1− 1/N) = (lk − lk−1)N (72)
H(S(i)) = (lk − lk−1)L/(N − 1) = lk − lk−1 (73)
The schemes for each sub-message are also independent. As our scheme is a concatenation of
multiple independent correct and private SPIR schemes, the overall concatenated scheme is also
correct and private. The proof is similar to Theorem 4 of [17] and is thus omitted.
Finally, the rate and the amount of common randomness are as follows.
Rk =
H(Wk)
D
=
∑K
i=1H(Wk(i))∑K
i=1Dk(i)
(72)
=
lkL
lKN
=
lk
lK
(
1− 1
N
)
(74)
ρ =
H(S)
H(WK)
=
∑K
i=1H(S(i))
lKL
(73)
=
lK
lkL
=
1
N − 1 (75)
Therefore, the achievability of Theorem 2 is proved.
4.2.2 Converse
The converse proof is almost identical to that of Theorem 1. Note that (51) holds for all lk and all
k, we have
N max
i
li ≤ (N − 1)D/L (76)
⇒ Rk = lkL/D ≤ lk
maxi li
(
1− 1
N
)
(77)
Therefore the rate bound is proved. The common randomness bound is identical to (69). Note
that (69) holds for all k ∈ [1 : K].
11
4.3 Proof for Theorem 3
4.3.1 Achievability
Suppose L = G1(N−1)+L1, where G1 = bL/(N−1)c and L1 ∈ [0 : N−2]. Note that the capacity
achieving scheme for SPIR when L is not restricted is based on dividing the messages to blocks of
length N − 1 (refer to Theorem 1). The optimal scheme for finite L setting is constructed by first
using the capacity achieving SPIR scheme G1 times to retrieve G1(N − 1) bits, and then for the
remaining L1 bits, we use the capacity achieving SPIR schemes with only L1 + 1 ≤ N databases
(say, the first L1 + 1 databases), if L1 ≥ 1. Otherwise if L1 = 0, then we are done. Note that for
the SPIR scheme that uses only L1 + 1 databases, the rate is 1 − 1/(L1 + 1), the message size is
L1 + 1− 1 = L1 bits, and the common randomness ratio is ρ = 1/(L1 + 1− 1) = 1/L1. Therefore,
overall, the rate and the amount of common randomness are as follows.
R =
{
G1(N−1)
G1N
= 1− 1N , if L1 = 0,
G1(N−1)+L1
G1N+L1+1
, otherwise.
(78)
ρ =
{
G1
G1(N−1) =
1
N−1 , if L1 = 0,
G1+1
G1(N−1)+L1 =
bL/(N−1)c+1
L , otherwise.
(79)
=
dL/(N − 1)e
L
(80)
Next, we prove that the rate achieved in (78) matches that in Theorem 3, i.e., L/d L1−1/N e. When
L1 = 0 (L is an integer multiple of N − 1), the claim follows trivially. Hereafter, we consider
L1 > 0. It suffices to show that the download cost, D = L/R = G1N + L1 + 1, satisfies D ∈
[ L1−1/N ,
L
1−1/N + 1). In the converse of Theorem 1, we have showed that for arbitrary L and all
SPIR schemes, D ≥ L1−1/N holds. So we are left to show that D < L1−1/N + 1.
D = G1N + L1 + 1 (81)
<
G1(N − 1) + L1
1− 1/N + 1 (N ≥ 2) (82)
=
L
1− 1/N + 1 (83)
Therefore the achievability proof is complete.
4.3.2 Converse
We show for fixed finite L, the achievable rate R ≤ L/d L1−1/N e. Equivalently, it suffices to prove
that the download cost D = L/R ≥ d L1−1/N e ≥ L1−1/N , which follows from Theorem 1. Note
that Theorem 1 holds when we require exactly zero error. Also note that since the downloads are
assumed to be in terms of symbols from the same field as the message symbols, the download cost
must be an integer value.
We are left to prove the common randomness bound. Similar to the download cost, which is
restricted to be integers, in the finite length regime the amount of common randomness, ρL is
restricted to take integer values as well. Therefore, from (69), we have ρL ≥ dL/(N − 1)e (for this
setting, lk = 1).
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5 Conclusion
For K messages and N databases, the capacity of SPIR was shown to be C = 1− 1/N . In order to
achieve any positive rate for SPIR, the minimum amount of common randomness needed among
the databases was shown to be 1/(N − 1) bits per message bit. Remarkably, this is also sufficient
to achieve the capacity of SPIR. The insights extend to settings with unequal message sizes and
finite length messages.
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